The consensus against species having intrinsic essences has recently been challenged. The challengers have taken some account of criticisms of this essentialism, but they have not fully engaged with a range of criticisms, particularly those of Dupré, stemming from views of the metaphysics of essences in general. I argue that these views are largely mistaken. All kinds have essences which may be intrinsic, relational, or partly both. Essences are interesting because they are “super-explanatory”, explaining the kind’s place in the causal nexus. The case for species essentialism rests on this metaphysics of essences. Dupré’s metaphysics wrongly takes the following to count against essentialism: that species should be conceived of as individuals not kinds; a kind’s lack of sharp boundaries; variation and change in a kind; taxonomic pluralism. Finally, contra Dupré, classification in science, including biology, is of kinds with explanatory essences that it is the business of science to investigate.
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