Inconsistent Abortion: A Critical Phenomenology of a Hidden Practice - Progress Review Lily Elston-Leadbetter

 In my first chapter, I lay the philosophical groundwork for understanding the development of consciousness from Descartes to Kant. I take this concept as my point of departure because the aim of phenomenology, according to Husserl, is to create a science of consciousness. The theoretical discussion will be accompanied by a consideration of how these popular ideas of selfhood pertain to aborting people. Such theories are often applied to either pregnant people or their foetuses to argue for or against the practice; however, these attempts often lack a consideration of the experience of the pregnant person and focus instead on speculations and commonly held assumptions. I argue that phenomenology provides a more comprehensive, careful, and compassionate account of the experience of abortion that cannot be achieved through purely metaphysical means. The goal is to develop a relational phenomenological ontology which is sympathetic to unique persons while rejecting atomised and individualistic approaches to selfhood.