Doxastic Normativity in Hume: a sceptical reliabilist proposal - Peter Kearney Progress Review

A persistent puzzle in the interpretation of David Hume is how to reconcile his radically sceptical conclusions about the possibility of justified belief with his commitment to a “science of human nature”.

I advance a novel approach to the problem, according to which Hume suspends reflective assent as to whether any of our beliefs are justified but nevertheless sceptically assents to various beliefs by acquiescing in certain “instincts and propensities of nature”.

This talk focusses on the problem of doxastic normativity: on what basis does Hume approve of some methods of belief-formation over others, given that fully reflective inquiry fails to provide support for any such belief-forming methods? I examine a variety of existing approaches to the problem and argue that none of them fully succeeds. I put forward a proposal according to which Hume discriminates between belief-forming methods according to their “apparent reliability” in predicting and controlling events.