Transparency, Legibility, and Expertise. Guest Lecture by Adam Piovarchy from The University of Notre Dame

This paper introduces the concept of ‘legibility’ to the analytic philosophy lexicon, distinguishes it from ‘transparency’ which has recently received some scrutiny, and demonstrates the utility of the former for understanding a number of important dynamics relevant to social epistemologists. I first distinguish legibility from transparency, considering Nguyen’s (2021) recent argument that transparency can decrease expert decision-making by pressuring experts to cater to what non-experts think seems adequate. I argue that the bad effects he outlines are better described as products of increasing legibility. Whereas transparency is about making things observable, legibility is about making them interpretable. Using the example of dispensing medical advice, I then show how perverse incentives can also cause experts to make even simple information illegible to non-experts, and how being in a position where one can be recognised as an expert can trade-off against being able to actually exercise one’s expertise. I close by arguing that legibility is also relevant for achieving procedural and distributive justice, using the example of illegible criteria in academic job postings which unfairly disadvantage students from non-traditional backgrounds.  

Venue

01-E302 or zoom Join from PC, Mac, Linux, iOS or Android: https://uqz.zoom.us/j/4646329470?omn=89281474112