Shame, Love, and Being Seen (Progress Review 3) Maddy Shield

My thesis considers the phenomenological and moral structure of shame, conceptualised as an emotion which results from a loss of emotional connection with others that is taken to be due to one’s personal defectiveness. The claims of each chapter, which rest upon this conceptualisation, are as follows:

1. Contrary to classic philosophical accounts, the individual does not need to possess self-respect in order to feel shame; in fact, given that shame is a condemnation of the whole self, its structure is antithetical to feelings of respect and love for the self.

2. Philosophers have been wrong to suggest that vulnerability itself causes shame: it is not simply being looked at which makes one feel ashamed, but being looked at and not being seen, or accepted, for who one really is.

3. We cannot force another person to feel shame; they must to some extent agree with the shaming judgement. However, shame is not truly autonomous either, because it always occurs before an audience.

4. Shame is primarily different to guilt in that it is inherently globalist, condemning one’s entire self, and intersubjective, requiring an audience.

5. The globalism of shame is too imprecise to be able to target specific flaws or behaviours, and too all-encompassing to encourage the feeling that one deserves, or is capable of, moral redemption.

6. Shame motivates a person through fear of punishment rather than moral conscience, which impairs its capacity to effect constitutive, rather than merely regulative, change.