Humes’ scepticism, ancient scepticism and the nature of sceptical assent. Progress review - Peter Kearney

David Hume draws what appear to be radically sceptical conclusions about the possibility of justified belief. However, Hume continues to discriminate between beliefs and inferences, recommending some as “just” and condemning others as “unjust”, and develops a “science of man” which he seems to regard as having at least some measure of justification. On what basis can Hume discriminate between beliefs and claim that his science is justified, when his scepticism seems to destroy any basis for claiming justification? This has been referred to as the “integration problem” in the interpretation of Hume. Commentators have advanced a range of approaches to the problem, but all face difficulties.

This thesis seeks to develop a novel approach to the integration problem through the development of a notion of “sceptical assent” which captures the mode in which Hume approves of certain beliefs and inferences while at the same time maintaining Hume’s sceptical conclusions. The requisite notion of sceptical assent will draw on concepts of sceptical assent in ancient Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism, in which the sceptic “follows” or “approves” of certain appearances, while “suspending judgement” or “withholding assent“ as to their truth.

This talk describes the integration problem and approaches to solving it, sketches concepts of sceptical assent in ancient scepticism, and briefly outlines an interpretation of Hume as a suspensive sceptic who suspends judgement on issues such as whether reason supports any beliefs, whether past experience provides evidential support for predictions about the future and whether there is an external world of independent, persisting objects.